Title: Pursuit Management Task Force Report
Series: n/a
Author: National Law Enforcement and Corrections
Technology Center
Published: September 1998
Subject: law enforcement vehicle pursuit
pages: 145
bytes:
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------------------------------
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice
Pursuit Management Task Force Report
September 1998
Kenneth L. Bayless
Region Chief, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department
Task Force Chairman
Robert Osborne
Lieutenant, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department
Principal Author
Final Project Report
Submitted by:
The Aerospace Corporation
2350 East El Segundo Boulevard
El Segundo, California 90245-4691
310-336-2171
NCJ 172200
------------------------------
National Institute of Justice
Jeremy Travis
Director
This project was supported by the National Law
Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center
(NLECTC)-Western Region; Robert Pentz, Director.
This Regional Center is operated by The Aerospace
Corporation for the National Institute of Justice.
This project was supported under award number 96-
IJ-CX-K007 from the National Institute of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of
Justice. Points of view in this document are those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent
the official position of the U.S. Department of
Justice.
------------------------------
PURSUIT MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE
Kenneth L. Bayless, Chairman
Region Chief
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Members at Large:
Robert Pentz, Director
NLECTC-West
El Segundo, California
Robert Osborne, Principal Author
Lieutenant, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, California
Legal Issues Subcommittee:
Martin Mayer, Esq., Chairman
Mayer, Coble & Palmer
Long Beach, California
Vehicle-Stopping Technologies Subcommittee:
Bill Pink, Chairman
United States Border Patrol
Chris Aldridge, Director
Border Research and Technology Center
San Diego, California
Richard Emerson, Chief of Police
Chula Vista, California
Tim Grimmond, Chief of Police
El Segundo, California
Dr. Edward Scannell
Army Research Laboratory
Adelphi, Maryland
Operational Practices, Procedures, and
Policies Subcommittee:
Michael Nicley, Chairman
United States Border Patrol
Chris Aldridge, Director
Border Research and Technology Center
San Diego, California
John Downey, Captain
Oregon State Police
Gary Dominguez, Chief
California Highway Patrol
Earl Morris, Director
Utah Department of Public Safety
Steve Simonian, Chief of Police
Montebello, California
Technical Support Staff:
Michael Epstein
NLECTC-West
El Segundo, California
Robert Waldron
NLECTC-West
El Segundo, California
Gail Klass
NLECTC-West
El Segundo, California
Community Issues Subcommittee:
Dennis Runyen, Captain, Chairman
San Diego County Sheriff's Department
California
Chris Aldridge, Director
Border Research and Technology Center
San Diego, California
Richard Carlson, Assistant Director
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Gary Learn, Captain
San Diego, California, Police Department
Dick McKee, Deputy Chief
Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police
Adjunct Staff:
Tony Affinito, Sergeant
El Segundo, California, Police
Mike Ault, Captain
Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police
Bill Boggs, Analyst
United States Border Patrol
Arnie Forsyth, Agent in Charge
United States Border Patrol
Glicet Garvey, Supervisory Agent
United States Border Patrol
Gordon Graham, Lieutenant
California Highway Patrol
John Keller, Special Projects Office
California Highway Patrol
Rick Strait, Special Agent
United States Border Patrol
Richard Strickland, Lieutenant
Chula Vista, California, Police
Other Participants:
Frank Barker, Deputy Chief
Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police
Jack Devereaux, Captain
Orange County Sheriff's Department
California
Ed Gomez, Chief
California Highway Patrol
Earl Hardy
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Brian Traynor
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
------------------------------
NOTICES
The Pursuit Management Task Force (PMTF), in the
preparation of this report, advises the reader of
the following intended limitations and exclusions
pertaining to this report.
o This report is not a technical treatise. Words
and phrases are used as they are commonly used,
rather than as they are used in technical or legal
writings unless otherwise designated.
o The PMTF has not and does not intend to evaluate
agencies' pursuit policies for reasonableness or
adherence to law. Policies were reviewed to
determine the current state of the practice of
pursuit management, specifically as they may
relate to the development or use of
pursuit-related technologies. The PMTF does not
advocate any specific type or content for police
pursuit policies.
o The PMTF does not recommend any particular
technology product. Nothing in this report is
intended to be construed as a product endorsement.
The PMTF reviewed a wide variety of products and
ideas. Mention of a particular product by name
does not indicate endorsement. The PMTF has not
been involved in product testing for liability or
safety-related purposes. The PMTF as a whole and
some individual members acting on behalf of the
PMTF have witnessed product demonstrations. These
product demonstrations or presentations do not
equate to product testing.
o The PMTF's descriptions of pursuits or police
tactics or other actions do not constitute an
endorsement of them, nor are they intended to set
any professional standard of conduct. This
includes, but is not limited to, pursuit phases
concepts and any descriptions of agency or
individual policies, procedures, or practices.
o Each of the PMTF's recommendations includes,
whether specifically stated or not, compliance
with all applicable laws and regulations,
including those pertaining to public and employee
exposures, safety regulations, due process, care
and diligence, and all required training to ensure
competence in the use of any equipment or device.
------------------------------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pursuit Management Task Force
Notices
Executive Summary
Chapter I: Introduction
Origin, Purpose, and Scope
Uniqueness of the PMTF
Technology Emphasis
Terms and Methodology
Technology Classifications
Preemption, Control, and Termination Concepts
Chapter II: Operational Practices, Procedures, and
Policies
Pursuit Policies
Survey Results: Current Practices and Policies
Survey Results: Training
Pursuit Phases
Prepursuit Phase
Communication Phase
Arrival of Resources Phase
Postpursuit Phase
Summary
Pursuit Duration and Collisions
Legal Intervention Techniques
Chapter III: Community Issues
Public Opinion Survey
Policy Issues
Technology Issues
Line Officer Survey
Comparison of Public and Line Officer Survey
Results
Literature Review
Dealing With Polarization
Public Relations and Education Initiatives
Chapter IV: Legal Issues
Legal Impact of Technology Development and Use
Reasonableness of Seizures
Product Design Negligence
Adequate Warnings
Negligent Use
Legislation
Chapter V: Vehicle-Stopping Technologies
The Silver Bullet Assumption
The Man on the Moon Assumption
Types of Pursuit Technologies
Mechanical Systems
Chemical Systems
Electrical Systems
Deployment Platforms
Helicopter Platforms
Police Car Platforms
Pre-Emplaced Platforms
Specialized Vehicle Platforms
Analysis of Sample Technologies
Mechanical Devices
Spiked Strips
Caltrops
Vehicle Taggers
Barriers
Entanglers/Nets
Helicopters
Electrical Systems
Direct Injection
Radiative Systems
Chemical Systems
Cooperative Systems
Sensory Technologies
Design and Use Parameters
What We Need
What We Want
Silver Bullet or an Armory?
Research and Development Priorities
Chapter VI: Summary of Conclusions and
Recommendations
Chapter I--Introduction
Chapter II--Operational Practices, Procedures,
and Policies
Chapter III--Community Issues
Chapter IV--Legal Issues
Chapter V--Vehicle-Stopping Technologies
Priority Listing of Recommendations
Appendixes
Appendix I: Survey Forms
Agency Heads: Vehicle Pursuit Termination--
Technology Survey
Patrol Officers: Pursuit Management Task Force
Survey
Telephone Survey: Pursuit Management Task Force
Public Awareness/Perception Study
Appendix II: Legal Issues Subcommittee's Research
State Law Negligence
Liability Issues
Failure to Warn
State Immunities
Privacy Issues
Failure to Train
Fourth Amendment Issues
Summary
Appendix III: Laws From the State of Utah
Appendix IV: References
Appendix V: Miscellaneous Products and Literature
------------------------------
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Report of the Pursuit Management Task Force
This Executive Summary Report of the Pursuit
Management Task Force (PMTF) provides an overview
of the work of the PMTF. Because it is only an
overview, it is important that the entire report
be read in order to grasp the issues addressed in
the report and the ensuing recommendations.
A summary of the PMTF's recommendations is
provided at the end of the report for those who
may want to refer quickly and directly to the
recommendations.
The main headings of the Executive Summary
correspond to the chapter titles of the report.
Introduction
In August 1996, the National Institute of
Justice's (NIJ's) Office of Science and Technology
created the PMTF to conduct a multidisciplinary
effort to define police practices and the role of
technology in high-speed police pursuits. The PMTF
was asked to look at the entire range of pursuit
issues including preemption of pursuits, control
of pursuits in progress, and termination of
pursuits.
Members of the PMTF included senior law
enforcement officers from local, State, regional,
and Federal agencies, as well as experts from
related fields. They were selected by the
respective Advisory Councils of the Border
Research and Technology Center, located in San
Diego, California, and the National Law
Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center
(NLECTC)-West, in El Segundo, California. The
PMTF's effort is under the direction of NLECTC-
West.
The PMTF is unique in its potential to provide
technologists and policymakers with a law
enforcement needs-based assessment of useful
technical approaches to enhance pursuit policies
and practices. Building or enhancing cooperative
and constructive relationships between law
enforcement, entrepreneurs, and technologists
could be a key component in the development,
commercialization, and use of pursuit-related
technologies. The PMTF surveyed police agencies
and officers throughout the western United States
to determine the types of technologies agencies
would be likely to use. It is intended that this
report will assist technologists and entrepreneurs
by providing information that will enhance the
usefulness of their products.
To reach its goals, the PMTF focused upon the
following four areas:
1.--Current operational practices, procedures, and
policies related to pursuits throughout the
western United States.
2.--Community issues and concerns, including
surveys of civilians and line law enforcement
officers throughout the western United States.
3.--Legal issues pertaining to pursuits and
related areas.
4.--Vehicle-stopping technologies, including
technologies currently available, under
development, and potentially available.
Technologies were grouped into five categories:
electrical, mechanical, chemical, cooperative, and
sensory. Types of technologies in each category
were reviewed and evaluated for their usefulness
in law enforcement pursuit applications.
Operational Practices, Procedures, and Policies
The PMTF surveyed heads of law enforcement
agencies throughout the western region to
determine the current "state of the art" in
pursuits. Some 1,420 questionnaires were mailed,
and 419 (29.5 percent) were completed and
returned. The PMTF found a wide array of pursuit
policies in use among the responding agencies.
With the exception of those about spiked strips,
few of the responses addressed areas related to
technologies, primarily because few agencies had
technologies to use. The survey, and concurrent
contacts with police driver-training instructors,
demonstrated a need for new fiscal resources to
address police training needs in emergency and
pursuit driving techniques and policies.
The PMTF provided technologists with information
about how pursuits actually occur by developing
the concept of "pursuit phases." The task force
identified four distinct phases of a pursuit: the
prepursuit phase, the communication phase, the
arrival of resources phase, and the postpursuit
phase. Each phase is described from an officer's
perspective, and opportunities for applying
various technologies to preempt or terminate the
pursuit are presented.
The PMTF found, by examining data collected by the
State of California for the years 1994 through
1996, that more than 50 percent of all pursuit
collisions (as reported by agencies statewide)
occurred during the first 2 minutes of a pursuit.
More than 70 percent of all collisions occurred
before the 5th minute of a pursuit, and 83 percent
of all collisions occurred before the 6th minute
of a pursuit. This information is of extreme
importance, since it shows that a pursuit
technology must be very rapidly deployed and used
in order to have a significant impact in
preventing pursuit-related collisions. Large,
complex, or stationary devices, unless used in a
preemptive mode, appear to have little potential
effect on pursuit collisions because of the delay
required to set them up.
Community Issues
The PMTF used a contract firm, Luth Research,
Inc., of San Diego, California, to conduct and
analyze surveys of community members and frontline
law enforcement officers to determine their
attitudes and beliefs about pursuits and related
technologies.
The public opinion survey revealed strong support
for reasonable police pursuits. Further, it
revealed a high degree of "don't know" answers
related to the application or suitability of
various types of pursuit technologies. In fact,
when asked to describe their ideal instrument or
tool to stop fleeing suspects, the lead-ing answer
(26 percent) was "don't know." There was support
for electrical and spiked-strip technologies, as
well as for devices activated through laser or
pager technology.
Line officers likewise strongly supported
reasonable pursuits, with strong agreement for
effective supervision of them. They also expressed
a preference for spiked strips and electrical
vehicle-stopping technologies.
The PMTF conducted a literature search for
information regarding police pursuits. As many
researchers before have noted, there is still a
surprising lack of widespread data on the subject.
Much of the public information was based upon
small number data pools coupled with large number
extrapolations and professional "estimates." This
clearly is not the best way to obtain data
relative to such an important topic and
illustrates the need to develop appropriate
methods of data collection.
Through its research, the PMTF found that accurate
information about pursuits needs to be provided to
the public in order to overcome misperceptions and
stereotypes as well as to garner support for
development and use of technologies. The PMTF
recommends that the Federal Government use the
influence and expertise of its offices to further
public education about pursuits.
Legal Issues
The PMTF examined a variety of legal issues
related to pursuit technologies, including the
reasonableness of seizures, product design
negligence, adequate warnings, and negligent use.
In addressing these issues, the PMTF provides
practical recommendations for limiting liability
by ensuring product safety in design and use.
The PMTF also recommends legislative actions
related to pursuits. Among the issues addressed
are the adequacy and potential for deterrence of
criminal sanctions against persons who use
vehicles to flee from officers, the need for
limited immunities for officers and agencies
engaged in reasonable pursuits and/or
non-negligent use of pursuit termination
technology, the need for pursuit data collection,
laws that would enhance police access to
cooperative systems technologies, and the need to
continue allocating resources for the research,
development, and commercialization of
pursuit-related technologies.
Vehicle-Stopping Technologies
The PMTF found that there is, at present, no
single technology on the horizon that appears to
be a "universal" solution to pursuits. The need
for additional research is apparent, and the task
force recommends the further allocation of
resources for pursuit technology research,
development, and commercialization and assistance
in the transfer of defense-related technologies to
civilian law enforcement use. The PMTF also notes
the necessity for cooperative involvement of
appropriate law enforcement officials,
technologists, and policymakers in field testing
and development of these technologies.
Technologists are provided with information from
the law enforcement perspective on various
technology deployment platforms, including
helicopters, chase vehicles, other police units,
fixed emplacements, and specialized vehicles. In
light of the high percentage of collisions that
occur during the first few minutes of a pursuit,
the preference for using standard police vehicles
as deployment platforms for general law
enforcement operations becomes apparent. For other
applications involving fixed-point security or
checkpoint operations (such as border and toll
crossings, immigration checkpoints, and site
security operations), other deployment platforms
are also feasible.
The task force reviewed various specific
technologies. Spiked strips were found to be the
most prevalent application and, currently, they
appear to be the most effective technology readily
available.
Most of the other technologies reviewed are in the
conceptual or precommercial phases and require
substantial testing and development. The PMTF is
quite interested in electrical systems and
cooperative systems, but other technologies have
promise as well. The PMTF listed the following, in
no particular order, as high priority for
additional research, development, and
commercialization based upon the entirety of their
research:
o Retractable direct injection electrical systems.
o Radiative electrical systems, including
high-power microwaves.
o Cooperative systems with law enforcement
activation.
o Auditory/visual sensory enhancements (improved
warning devices).
A summary of all the PMTF's recommendations
appears at the end of the report.
Priority Recommendations
The PMTF made several recommendations, but
established the following as their highest
priority recommendations at this time. As each is
considered essential for successfully impacting
the problems associated with law enforcement
pursuits, their listing is not in any numerical
priority.
1.--The PMTF recommends that more resources be
allocated to continue, expand, and accelerate
research, development, testing, and
commercialization of viable pursuit termination,
management, and prevention technologies, as well
as to support and assist the transfer of
appropriate defense technologies to civilian law
enforcement. These actions should be undertaken at
the local and regional level with local agencies
and regional organizations involved in the
evaluation of technologies for prototyping and
operational testing of any prototypes developed.
In order to realize these objectives, the PMTF
recommends that:
o An accelerated "Phase III" program be commenced
to deliver to local and regional law enforcement
agencies electrical, electromagnetic, or other
technology prototypes or series of prototypes for
operational testing and evaluation by local and
regional law enforcement agencies within 12 months
from the issuance of this report. It is
recommended that one or two prototypes be built
and tested and that substantial resources be
allocated to each prototype to ensure adequate
engineering.
o Law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to
participate with vendors and suppliers in
developing prototypes in response to any
solicitations seeking to satisfy the above
requirements. If a promising technology is
proposed without participation/involvement by
several law enforcement agencies or regional
bodies such as the PMTF, the PMTF recommends that
the NLECTC program assist in pairing local
agencies or a regional body with the proposing
vendor.
o Appropriate action be taken to encourage
continued cooperation between agencies of the
Department of Defense (DoD) and civilian law
enforcement to provide a stable basis for
continuing and accelerating the transfer of
appropriate defense technology, including pursuit
termination technology, for law enforcement use.
2.--The PMTF recommends that the following
technologies be identified as
high priority and moved quickly and aggressively
to prototype stages for evaluation:
o Retractable direct injection electrical systems.
o Radiative electrical systems, including
high-power microwaves.
o Cooperative systems with law enforcement
activation.
o Auditory/visual sensory enhancements (improved
warning devices).
3.--The PMTF recommends that a national model for
collection of pursuit statistics be developed,
perhaps through the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) or similar professional
law enforcement organization, for the purpose of
encouraging and facilitating research and to
expand the body of knowledge relating to pursuits.
4.--The PMTF recommends that States adopt
legislation that ensures that fleeing from a
lawful attempt at detention/arrest in a motor
vehicle is a serious crime with significant
penalties.
5.--The PMTF recommends that the Federal
Government use its expertise to educate and
inform the public about pursuits.
6.--The PMTF finds that communications
enhancements, while not a primary focus of the
PMTF's examination of pursuit-related
technologies, certainly would be beneficial in
safely managing interagency or long-distance
pursuits and recommends that research be conducted
to determine methods to improve interagency
tactical communications technology.
------------------------------
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Origin, Purpose, and Scope
In recent years, there have been few areas of
police practice that have raised as much public
comment, concern, outcry, and debate as vehicular
pursuits. Highly publicized accounts of
pursuit-related collisions and the resulting
injuries and deaths of officers, suspects, and
innocent persons have focused debate concerning
pursuits primarily into two diverse camps: those
who believe law enforcement should not engage in
vehicular pursuits (except, perhaps, for violent
or life-threatening felons) and those who believe
that policies that prohibit pursuits can lead to a
breakdown of public safety as criminals refuse to
stop for police and simply drive away.
In the Old West, lawbreakers fled from justice by
mounting a horse and riding out of town.
Apprehension of fleeing outlaws was accomplished
by forming a posse, and the Old West version of
the pursuit was on.
Times have changed, but human nature, apparently,
has not. Criminals continue to try to avoid
detection and, when discovered, often still
attempt to avoid apprehension by fleeing pursuing
officers. But now criminals often use a ton of
metal, hurtling at high speed through densely
populated areas, instead of galloping horses in
isolated territories, to attempt their escape. The
motive behind their flight may remain the same,
but the potential societal consequences have
changed dramatically.
Data and estimates of the number and consequences
of police pursuits vary widely; only the most
callous people would be content to maintain the
status quo rather than seek appropriate ways to
decrease the dangers of such police pursuits.
In August 1996, the National Institute of
Justice's (NIJ's) Office of Science and Technology
created the Pursuit Management Task Force (PMTF)
to conduct a multidisciplinary effort to define
police practices and the role of technology in
high-speed police pursuits. The PMTF was asked to
look at the entire gamut of pursuit issues,
including preemption of pursuits, control of
pursuits in progress, and termination of pursuits.
Members of the PMTF include senior law enforcement
officers from local, State, regional, and Federal
agencies, as well as experts from related fields.
They were selected by the respective Advisory
Councils of the Border Research and Technology
Center, located in San Diego, California, and the
National Law Enforcement and Corrections
Technology Center (NLECTC)-West in El Segundo,
California. The PMTF's effort is under the
direction of NLECTC-West. Issues related to police
pursuits are of national concern. With this in
mind, PMTF chose to limit the scope of its study
to the nine western States for reasons of
practicality, including cost control and staying
within the PMTF's means to collect and process
data. This approach may not create a truly
national picture; however, it is believed that the
quantity of data received from the varied sizes
and types of
Federal, State, and local agencies that
participated can be applied generally to agencies
nationwide.
This report, the culmination of the PMTF's work,
provides an assessment of current techniques and
technologies related to pursuits, recommendations
regarding technology development and
commercialization, an overview of legal issues
related to pursuits and related technologies,
recommendations for legislative action, and
information obtained from questionnaires and
surveys completed by agencies, line officers, and
the general public related to pursuits and
technologies.
Uniqueness of the PMTF
The PMTF was designed and organized to be unique
among groups that have studied pursuit-related
issues. Its uniqueness stems from its membership,
primarily senior law enforcement officials from
throughout the western United States, its funding
being free from political ideation, its
information collection and methodology, and the
fact that it was not created in response to any
specific incident(s). Having no preset agenda or
anticipated outcomes other than the creation of
this report, the PMTF was free to make its own
independent assessment of the areas to be
researched, data to be collected, and
recommendations to be offered.
The PMTF is also unique in its potential to
provide technologists and government with a law
enforcement needs-based assessment of useful
technical approaches to enhance pursuit policies
and practices. Building or enhancing cooperative
and constructive relationships between law
enforcement, entrepreneurs, and technologists
could be a key component in the development,
commercialization, and use of pursuit-related
technologies. The PMTF surveyed police agencies
and officers throughout the western United States
to determine the types of technologies agencies
would be likely to use. It is intended that this
report will assist technologists and entrepreneurs
by providing information that will enhance the
usefulness of their products.
Finally, because of its affiliation with NIJ, the
PMTF is uniquely positioned to have access to
information and expertise regarding research,
development, and commercialization of potential
pursuit termination technologies funded by the
Federal Government, including the use of military
technologies and research previously unavailable
for civilian use.
Technology Emphasis
A wide range of issues could be considered under
the heading of "pursuit management." The PMTF,
however, focused on issues related to pursuit
technologies. Related topics will be addressed in
varying degrees; the reader, however, will rightly
discern a technological focus.
Although technology acquisition includes setting
policy for its use, policy issues were not
addressed by the PMTF in a substantive way, except
as they specifically apply to technologies. The
PMTF did not study model policies nor the policy
needs of the hundreds of agencies throughout the
western United States. It recommends that pursuit
policies be determined by local and/or State
bodies rather than by attempts to create a
specific, one-size-fits-all policy to address the
widely varied agency and community needs found
throughout the West.
Terms and Methodology
Because it primarily comprises law enforcement
professionals rather than scientists or
technologists, the PMTF chose to work from a
practical law enforcement perspective rather than
a highly technical academic or scientific
approach. Therefore, terms and phrases used in
this report should be interpreted as they are
commonly used, rather than as they are used in
technical reports, unless otherwise specified. The
word "pursuit" refers to vehicular pursuits of all
types; foot pursuits are not included unless
specifically referred to as such.
The western region and western United States refer
to the States belonging to the western region of
the NLECTC system. Those States are Alaska,
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada,
Oregon, Utah, and Washington.
To reach its goals, the PMTF decided to focus on
the following four areas:
1.--Current operational practices, procedures, and
policies related to pursuits throughout the
western United States. This focus included a
survey of agencies throughout the western region
to determine the current state of pursuits and the
viability of inserting technological interventions
as well as a review of current and past research
and literature pertaining to pursuit practices.
2.--Community issues and concerns, including a
sampling of public opinions regarding pursuits and
technologies from the western region, a
questionnaire sent to a sampling of line officers
from law enforcement agencies throughout the
western United States, and issues related to
public education regarding pursuits.
3.--Legal issues pertaining to pursuits, including
statutory laws, court decisions, liability
concerns, law enforcement training regarding
pursuits, constitutional issues pertaining to
using pursuit termination technologies, and
legislative recommendations.
4.--Vehicle-stopping technologies (including
technologies currently available, under
development, and potentially available), law
enforcement recommendations for design parameters,
a survey of various law enforcement agencies
regarding their use of and desire for
pursuit-related technologies, and recommendations
for further study and potential commercialization
of pursuit-related technologies.
Each of these focus areas is covered in a separate
chapter of this report.
Technology Classifications
The PMTF's research was open to any type of
technology that would be safe and effective in
addressing police pursuits. After considering a
wide range of products and ideas, the PMTF
identified the following classifications of
technologies:
o Electrical: Technologies that use direct
injection or radiative energy to upset or destroy
a fleeing vehicle's electrical components,
resulting in loss of power.
o Mechanical: Technologies such as spikes,
barriers, nets/entanglers, as well as tagging
systems (signaling devices or other identifiers
placed on a fleeing vehicle to allow it to be
tracked by law enforcement without having to
engage in pursuit).
o Chemical: Technologies that interfere with a
fleeing vehicle's internal combustion by inserting
one or more nonhazardous chemicals into the
combustion equation, upsetting the balance among
fuel, heat, and oxygen.
o Cooperative Systems: Technologies, generally a
subset of the electronic technologies, that are
pre-emplaced by a vehicle's owner or manufacturer
as a theft-deterrent or vehicle recovery system
and which may or may not be activated by law
enforcement to cause a fleeing vehicle to come to
a stop.
o Sensory Technologies: Those that impair or
irritate a driver's optical, auditory, or other
senses nonchemically; also those that enhance the
public's visibility or recognition of an
approaching emergency vehicle.
In addition, the PMTF is aware of several methods
of tactical pursuit intervention such as the
pursuit intervention technique (PIT), boxing in,
ramming, and channelization. Because of its
emphasis on technology, the PMTF did not study
tactical interventions per se.
In evaluating pursuit-related technologies, the
PMTF examined the impact of technologies on
preemption and control of pursuits as well as on
their potential for terminating a pursuit after
its inception.
It was the hope, and perhaps even the expectation,
of the PMTF membership that one or more
technologies previously not available to law
enforcement would emerge from this study as a
"silver bullet" that would significantly mitigate
the hazards of police pursuits without allowing
suspects to escape apprehension by fleeing. As you
will find in this report, no silver bullet has
been found.
Preemption, Control, and Termination Concepts
When considering technological pursuit
interventions, people typically focus on stopping
pursuits already in progress. However, technology
has far broader potential application to pursuit
management than this. Technology can have a
variety of applications during several phases of a
pursuit (pursuit phases are addressed in chapter
II).
Technologies that preempt a pursuit would
certainly be an enhancement to public safety. Many
of the "cooperative" or market add-on technologies
of the vehicle recovery genre could be used to
prevent successful auto theft by rendering such
vehicles inoperable.
Technologies that assist in pursuers controlling a
pursuit can likewise improve overall public
safety. Such technologies could include enhanced
police communications equipment, video downlinks
from helicopters to ground command centers for
tracking vehicles attempting to flee, and vehicle
tagging technologies that enable remote tracking
or delayed recovery.
Throughout this report, the term "preemption"
refers to stopping a vehicle's opportunity to flee
prior to an actual pursuit, "control" refers to
measures designed to make continued apprehension
efforts safer, and "termination" refers to
measures or technologies designed to bring a
fleeing vehicle to a stop during a pursuit.
------------------------------
CHAPTER II
OPERATIONAL PRACTICES,
PROCEDURES, AND POLICIES
As part of its mission to examine and make
recommendations pertaining to pursuit-related
technologies, the PMTF had to determine the
current "state-of-the-art" of police pursuits.
Through its varied membership, the PMTF had a
broad understanding of local and regional issues
pertaining to pursuits. Nonetheless, the PMTF
distributed a questionnaire to 1,420 different law
enforcement agencies throughout the western United
States requesting information regarding police
pursuits, policies, practices, and technologies
currently in use or desired. The questionnaire was
sent by mail, addressed to the chief of police,
sheriff, commissioner, or other designated agency
head. A number of surveys were sent to small,
specialized agencies such as transit, housing, and
university police departments. At the time of this
report, 419 questionnaires (29.5 percent) have
been completed and returned for analysis, and
others continue to trickle in. The PMTF
intentionally sent the questionnaire as a
voluntary-completion instrument to gauge interest
in pursuits among the various agencies in the
western region. The return rate demonstrated
strong interest in pursuits and related
technologies among the heads of law enforcement
agencies.
Pursuit Policies
In recent years, there has been tremendous
interest in the establishment of pursuit policies.
Much of the impetus for addressing concerns of
pursuits has been driven by litigation-related
issues. While policy, supervision, and training
are all important to providing successful pursuit
outcomes, they are not the sole answer to safe
pursuits. Policies and laws merely address the
rules by which agencies must abide during
pursuits. They do not solve the problem of
stopping a fleeing vehicle; they regulate the
process by which it is done. The solution that
actually stops fleeing vehicles lies in the
potentially synergistic relationships between
policy, law, supervision, training, and
technology. The primary issue facing the PMTF was
to determine what technologies should be developed
and made available to counteract the technology
that enables a vehicle to be used for illegal
flight from police.
The PMTF requested that a copy of the agency's
pursuit policy be returned with the completed
questionnaire. Of the 419 questionnaires returned,
more than three-fourths included a copy of their
pursuit policy. The PMTF members reviewed the
policies to determine how they could impact
technology development.
Pursuit policies tended toward one of three types:
those that severely restricted pursuits, those
that set standards for pursuits but allowed
broader officer and/or supervisory discretion to
pursue, and those that set minimal standards
regarding pursuits.
Severely restrictive policies generally allowed
for pursuing only felons, serious or assaultive
misdemeanants, and those whose conduct was such a
danger to the public that the anticipated hazards
of pursuit were outweighed by the danger posed by
allowing the conduct to continue. A few restricted
pursuits to so-called "deadly force"
circumstances. In the PMTF survey, no departments
that use marked patrol cars equipped with
emergency lights and sirens banned pursuits
outright. Very few policies mentioned any
technologies for pursuit termination other than
communication equipment and helicopter
observation, except for those agencies that
permitted the use of spiked tire deflation
devices.
Such restrictive policies pose a dilemma for law
enforcement officials. For example, in the State
of California, possession of brass knuckles is a
felony, while possession of a loaded and concealed
firearm is a misdemeanor. A "felony only" pursuit
policy would sanction a pursuit of someone
possessing brass knuckles, but would prohibit
pursuit of someone carrying the obviously more
lethal fully-loaded firearm. Consider the
following scenarios:
On February 16, 1995, Sacramento County
(California) sheriff's deputies attempted to stop
a vehicle for expired registration. The suspects
fled and, after a 3-minute pursuit, the vehicle
collided with a parked car. Both suspects fled on
foot and were subsequently apprehended by the
deputies. A carjacking victim was found still
alive in the trunk of the suspect vehicle. He had
a bullet wound in his neck.
A police officer arrives at a "man with a gun"
call. He observes a group of known gang members
standing next to a car examining several handguns.
As the officer approaches, the gang members spot
him and quickly jump into their car. The officer
activates his patrol car's red lights and siren,
but the gang members' car speeds away. The officer
pulls to the curb, gets out, contacts the person
who called, and explains that his department will
not allow officers to pursue misdemeanants.
A resident arrives home from work to observe a
burglar busily carrying his appliances out a
window and placing them into a small van parked at
the curb. The resident uses his cellular telephone
to summon police. A few minutes later, an officer
arrives just as the burglar is preparing to drive
off. The officer pulls in behind the van and
activates her red lights and siren. The van speeds
off. The officer stops her patrol car, talks
briefly on the radio, gets out and approaches the
resident with report forms in hand. "Why aren't
you going after him! You're letting him get away!"
he shouts. "Oh," she replies, "my department
policy prohibits pursuits unless deadly force is
authorized."
Examples like the above demonstrate that very
restrictive policies may not provide a community
with the sense of protection from lawlessness that
it deserves.
Some agencies have addressed the hazards of
pursuits by developing policies that mention
criteria that officers must consider in initiating
or continuing a pursuit, but do not restrict
pursuits to specific types or classifications of
crime (except, perhaps, for traffic violations.)
Such policies might be seen as more palatable than
the highly restrictive policies previously
described, in that the community can sense that
law violators will not be allowed to go free
simply by driving away. Likewise, these policies
pose a serious dilemma for law enforcement.
Pursuit litigation under these types of policies
may focus upon the subjective nature of the
reasonableness of an officer's actions in
initiating or continuing a pursuit. Most of these
policies include statements that require the
officer to abandon a pursuit if the danger to the
public exceeds the benefit to be gained by
apprehension of the person fleeing. Consider
another scenario:
A deputy sheriff observes a suspect putting the
finishing touches on some very offensive graffiti
on the side of a public building. The suspect
flees and the officer gives chase. While pursuing
at 45-50 mph in a posted 35 mph zone, the pursuit
passes an isolated apartment complex, out of which
a small child chasing a ball runs into the street
and is struck by the pursuing police vehicle.
Was this pursuit reasonable? One of the problems
with attempting to resolve public safety concerns
with this type of policy is that, frequently, the
reasonableness of a pursuit is questioned only
after some tragic event has occurred. In addition,
"reasonableness" is often determined by a jury
through the adversarial processes of litigation
rather than through more objective means. There is
little doubt that a juror, when asked if the
capture of a single felonious (high-dollar loss)
vandal is worth more than a person's life, will
answer, "No." The impact of letting every such
criminal escape apprehension is seldom discussed.
Providing minimal or no direction to officers who
may engage in pursuits obviously (at least to the
PMTF members) provides little protection for an
agency, its officers, or the public at large.
Policy direction is essential in this potentially
high-liability area of law enforcement.
There are those who support curtailing or
eliminating pursuits through restrictive laws
and/or policies as the best solution to the public
safety issues arising from pursuits. However, the
PMTF views more restrictive laws and policies
alone as only a partial solution at best. A more
complete solution capitalizes upon the potentially
synergistic partnerships between reasonable laws
and policies, effective supervision, training and
tactics, and viable, readily available
vehicle-stopping technology. Criminals still flee,
and flight should not be rewarded with continued
freedom. Is there some way to apprehend them
without putting the public at needless risk? Since
technology got us into this situation, can
technology be used to get us out?
Survey Results: Current Practices and Policies
The PMTF's survey of heads of law enforcement
agencies was sent by mail in February 1997 to
1,420 agencies throughout the western United
States (a copy of the survey instrument is
included in appendix I). Responses were received
from 337 municipal police departments, 69
sheriff's offices, and 13 State agencies. For
purposes of analysis, the PMTF divided responding
departments into small agencies (1-30 officers),
medium agencies (31-100 officers), large agencies
(101-500 officers), and very large agencies (more
than 500 officers).
In all, the agencies that returned surveys
represent 57,555 law enforcement officers and
serve approximately 44 million people over more
than 1 million square miles.
Agencies were asked to provide the total number of
pursuits their agency engaged in for calendar
years 1994 through 1996. Although some agencies
kept no such records, those that responded
reported 3,912 for 1994, 4,348 for 1995, and 4,003
for 1996--a total of 12,263 pursuits over the
3-year period. (Please note that many agencies
appear to have approximated the numbers of
pursuits they reported.) This represents
considerable frontline experience with police
pursuits and is probably a conservative estimate
of the actual numbers because some agencies had no
records of their pursuits.
Virtually every police agency allows for pursuit
under some circumstances. Of the responding
agencies, 99 percent allow their officers to
engage in pursuits, and 97 percent reported they
had a written pursuit policy. One agency claimed
to have a "no-pursuit" policy, but their policy,
which was attached to the survey, clearly allowed
pursuits for serious offenses. Another agency,
situated on a small island, has a "no-pursuit"
policy because there is no way that a fleeing
suspect can escape. One campus police agency has
no cars equipped with sirens or red lights; hence,
it has a "no-pursuit" policy. Also reporting were
110 agencies (26 percent) that generally do not
allow pursuit of misdemeanor suspects.
In addition, 85 percent of the responding agencies
reported that they require supervisory control of
pursuits. Of the 43 agencies that did not require
supervisory control, 39 were small departments (1-
30 officers) that frequently have no supervisor on
duty or available.
Fully one-third (138) of the agencies reported
that their policy does not address air support. Of
these, 121 came from small- and medium-sized
agencies which, presumably, do not have ready
access to air support.
One goal of the survey was to measure current use
of pursuit termination technologies. One hundred
and eighty-one agencies reported that they are
currently using some type of technology.
Ninety-six percent (173) reported using or
allowing the use of tire deflation devices. In
answer to how often the technology had been used
in the past 12 months, respondents reported 190
incidents. Forty-five percent of the agencies
reporting that they had tire deflation devices
indicated they had used them. Agencies with actual
field experience in using these devices reported
that they believed them to be efficient and cost
effective. One hundred and seven agencies (25.5
percent of the survey total) reported that they
were aware of pursuit technologies but chose to
not use them due to various concerns. Among those
cited were: cost or budget (79), availability
(63), potential liability (31), and concerns about
whether the technology was adequately developed
(10). (Note that some agencies provided multiple
responses to this question.)
The PMTF also sought information concerning use of
nontechnological pursuit termination techniques.
Agencies were specifically asked for information
about ramming, box-ins, channelization, and
barricades. Fifty percent of the responding
agencies (208) reported that their policies allow
for use of one (or more) such techniques. On a
use-of-force continuum, most agencies equated use
of these techniques in the area of deadly force.
The most common technique allowed was ramming (148
agencies) followed by box-ins (121), barricading
(105), and channelization (98). (Again, agencies
were allowed to provide multiple answers.)
Fourteen agencies reported that they allowed the
use of the PIT (Pursuit Intervention Technique),
wherein a pursued vehicle is forced to "spin out"
by a patrol car's contact.
Of interest to the PMTF was that only 63 percent
of the respondents believed that ramming was
efficient, compared with 89 percent who believed
tire deflation devices were efficient. Boxing in
(56 percent), channelization (50 percent), and
barricading (43 percent) were all perceived as
being less efficient than tire deflation devices.
(See figure 1.)
In the area of cost effectiveness, tire deflation
devices were perceived as being superior to any of
the other techniques described (tire deflation (94
percent); ramming (37 percent); box-ins (54
percent); channelization (54 percent); barricading
(50 percent)). Agencies with small fleets tended
to be reluctant to use their fleets as a tool to
stop a pursuit. (See figure 2.)
When asked about technologies of the future, 96
percent of the responding agencies favored
development of electronic disabling technology.
Mechanical devices were similarly well received by
90 percent of the agencies. There was strong
interest in having technologies that are handheld
(84 percent), considered to be "officer portable"
(91 percent), or deployed from a police car (89
percent). This indicates widespread interest in
portable devices. This does not discount an
interest in fixed-point or larger units, because
agencies were not asked to comment on them.
Eighty-eight percent of the respondents indicated
an interest in purchasing technologies (assuming
they could afford them), with 21 agencies noting
that the devices would be deployed from a
supervisor's car. Assuming the accuracy of
responses, the 209 agencies that indicated
interest in purchasing such devices could account
for approximately 2,661 devices.
Survey Results: Training
The PMTF agency survey also addressed issues of
training. This area is of concern, because any
technology provided to law enforcement agencies
for use in pursuit termination would require
training in its use.
Surprisingly, 23 percent (98) of the responding
agencies reported that no formal training was
provided to officers on pursuit policy. Small
agencies accounted for 62 of these responses, and
24 were from medium agencies. This appears to
reflect a tendency for smaller agencies not to
have the same type of training programs as larger
agencies, most likely due to perceived staffing
and budget constraints.
Agencies also were asked if they provide ongoing
training after academy graduation to their
officers in pursuit driving. One hundred and
twenty-one agencies (29 percent) did not.
Seventy-one of these were small agencies, 28 were
medium agencies, 18 were large agencies, and 4
were agencies of unspecified size.
The May 1997 NIJ Research in Brief, "Police
Pursuit: Policy and Training," describes
additional research and findings related to
pursuit policies and training resulting from the
responses of 436 law enforcement agencies in a
national survey.
In March 1997, three PMTF members attended the
yearly conference of the International Association
of Law Enforcement Emergency Response Trainers
(ALERT). They had the opportunity to interact with
emergency and pursuit driving trainers from across
the United States about issues related to
pursuits. Many in attendance bemoaned the fact
that agencies are not provided with sufficient
resources to provide this type of training. With
the exceptionally high price of training
simulators and scarcity of available high-speed
driving courses, the PMTF recommends that this
area of training for police emergency vehicle
drivers be considered worthy of dedicated and
specific support through resource allocation.
Pursuit Phases
When one mentions "police pursuit," an image comes
to mind. Often, the image is based upon a
Hollywood movie or television show's portrayal of
pursuits. Suspects weaving through traffic like
NASCAR drivers, leaving in their wake destroyed
police cars, multiple collisions, and vehicles
airborne over a variety of roadway bumps or flying
off cliffs deliver excitement and suspense to
viewers. However, anyone in the law enforcement
profession knows such images simply do not ring
true. How, then, can technologists obtain a
realistic picture of what a pursuit is actually
like so that successful intervention technologies
may be made possible?
As part of its effort to assist technologists in
their understanding of pursuits, the PMTF set out
to create a "time line" for a typical pursuit.
Early on, however, they discovered that no pursuit
was truly "typical." There are virtually unlimited
variables that significantly impact a police
pursuit. Variables such as weather and road
conditions, population density, proximity to other
agencies, communications, types of vehicles
involved, availability of air support, urban or
rural conditions, speeds, local policies, and
community attitudes were cited by the task force
membership. A different method of illustrating a
"typical" pursuit to show opportunities for
introducing pursuit-related technologies needed to
be developed.
After much discussion, the PMTF settled on the
concept of "pursuit phases." The hypothesis was
simple: each pursuit goes through a series of
predictable phases that are based upon the nature
of pursuits in general rather than upon variables
such as time, distance, and geography.
In its 1983 study of pursuits, the California
Highway Patrol identified five stages that precede
the onset of a pursuit. They were (1) commission
of a violation or crime, (2) observation by police
of the violator, (3) the violator becoming aware
of the police, (4) the violator deciding to flee,
and (5) the police deciding to give chase. After
the officer decides to pursue the violator, "the
violator may voluntarily stop or the officer may
voluntarily terminate his participation in the
pursuit. If neither occurs, three possibilities
exist: the violator may escape, he may be involved
in an accident, or both may occur."
There has been some progress since the California
Highway Patrol's 1983 study; yet, one of its basic
premises remains true. There are clearly
identifiable phases in a "typical" pursuit.
The PMTF identified four distinct phases of a
pursuit for its study. Each phase has unique
opportunities for appropriate technological
interventions. After a brief introduction to the
phases, each will be addressed more fully.
The first phase is the "Prepursuit Phase." This
phase encompasses the time period between an
officer's decision to attempt to stop a vehicle
and the officer's recognition that the driver of
the vehicle is attempting to flee.
The second phase is the "Communication Phase."
This is the period between the start of the
pursuit and the arrival of assisting officers or
resources. This phase typically comprises various
communication strategies, wherein the officer(s)
involved in the pursuit attempts to communicate to
other officers and dispatchers the nature and
progress of the pursuit to coordinate the arrival
of backup officers and any needed equipment.
The third phase is the "Arrival of Resources
Phase." This is the period during which assisting
personnel and/or equipment arrive and the phase
during which attempts to terminate an in-progress
pursuit would typically occur.
The fourth and final phase is the "Postpursuit
Phase." This encompasses any actions that occur
after the suspect's vehicle has stopped fleeing or
has eluded capture.
Prepursuit Phase
The Prepursuit Phase is one that may receive less
attention than is due it. With the emphasis upon
public safety, measures that can prevent a pursuit
from starting in the first place while still
affording law enforcement with the opportunity to
apprehend a suspect would receive enthusiastic
support.
Prepursuit can involve a variety of
considerations, including the following:
o Actions taken by the officer to minimize
opportunity for flight, including appropriate
tactics and coordination with other officers as
well as placement of technologies on/around
suspect vehicles under surveillance to prevent
their movement.
o Cooperative technologies (typically antitheft or
vehicle recovery devices) preinstalled by vehicle
owners to restrict or prevent vehicle movement
once unauthorized access to the vehicle has been
detected.
o Fixed-point systems installed at places where
the likelihood of pursuit is high, such as border
crossings, INS checkpoints, toll crossings, and
the like.
Officers face a number of complex variables as
they pass through a variety of decision points
during the Prepursuit Phase. They must decide upon
the location and manner of stop to be effected,
determine whether the suspect is actually deciding
to flee or is merely unaware of the officer's
presence, attempt to determine why the suspect may
be attempting to flee, evaluate the known or
suspected crime for which the suspect is wanted,
evaluate an endless set of variables that could
impact the potential safety of a pursuit,
determine whether all the preceding variables mesh
with their agency's pursuit policy and, finally,
decide whether to actually engage in the pursuit.
The officer typically has about 5 to 10 seconds to
go through this process, and the variables are
constantly changing.
Technology application during the Prepursuit Phase
is limited only by the ability of an officer (or
other person for cooperative systems) to apply the
technology before the suspect has the opportunity
to flee in the vehicle. Handheld tire deflators,
tagging systems, tracking systems, or electronic
disrupters could be put in place on a stopped
vehicle to prevent its mobility. Once a vehicle is
in motion, however, difficulties begin to arise.
In order to be effective at the Prepursuit Phase,
technologies need to be immediately deplorable by
the officer attempting the stop or (perhaps at a
border or other controlled crossing) by someone
pre-emplaced to act to stop fleeing vehicles.
Once a suspect vehicle takes overt action to elude
the officer and the officer decides to pursue, the
second phase begins.
Communication Phase
The moments immediately following the start of a
pursuit are particularly hectic. They are
characterized by a series of urgent radio
communications between the pursuing officer and
potential assisting officers as well as
dispatchers. As a rule, police pursuits are
essentially following actions; there is no real
intent to actually catch up to the suspect during
most pursuits. Rather, it is to keep the suspect
in sight until apprehension is made possible. The
suspect generally controls the level of hazard
posed by the pursuit by the intensity with which
he or she attempts to elude pursuing officers. The
main goals of the Communication Phase are to
advise dispatch of what is occurring and to garner
and coordinate sufficient resources--both
personnel and equipment--for the safe apprehension
of the suspect once the pursuit is over.
Officers need to be aware of the resources
available to them during this phase, both from
their own agency as well as from others. A small
agency may not have any air (helicopter) support
from his own agency, but air support may be
available under mutual aid from a larger adjoining
agency. One of the difficulties posed by pursuits
is the fact that they often cross jurisdictional
boundaries. Many agencies have antiquated
communications systems that do not allow pursuing
officers to communicate with other agencies and
that do not have adequate range for lengthy
pursuits. Communications enhancements, while not a
primary focus of the PMTF's examination of
pursuit-related technologies, certainly would be
beneficial in safely managing interagency or
long-distance pursuits.
The Communication Phase may be very short or very
long in duration based upon a variety of factors--
primarily the proximity of other officers and the
availability of other resources.
During the Communication Phase, the pursuing
officer, or the officer's supervisor, must again
traverse a range of decision points. These include
determining whether the pursuit continues to be
within policy without posing an unacceptable risk
to public safety, the level of force that would be
justified to terminate the pursuit, what
technologies are available to assist officers,
where the technologies are located and where they
should be deployed, the quality of communications
(especially interagency communications), and any
tactical considerations involved in deciding to
force the vehicle to stop as opposed to continuing
the following action.
Any of the technologies that can be deployed by
the pursuing officer while engaged in the pursuit
could be applied during this phase. However,
technologists must be aware that police cars are
typically occupied by only one officer who must
drive and talk throughout the pursuit. The ability
of this one officer to operate his patrol car
safely while simultaneously deploying a pursuit
termination technology is cause for concern and
illustrates why many in law enforcement view the
communication phase as difficult for the
introduction of technology.
Cooperative technologies may be quite useful
during this phase, however. This would be
especially true if the officer could be made aware
that the fleeing vehicle is equipped with a theft
deterrent or vehicle recovery system through
information gained by checking license numbers
through computerized vehicle registration files.
If such information could be located quickly,
technology could be implemented to allow the
officer to signal the vehicle's engine to stop or
otherwise cause the vehicle to become safely
inoperative.
With the exception of the cooperative and
communications technologies, the Communication
Phase can best be thought of as a bridge between
the inception of a pursuit and the arrival of
sufficient resources to safely terminate it.
Arrival of Resources Phase
The phase obviously begins with the arrival of the
resources requested during the Communications
Phase. Once needed resources are available,
officers have increased options for bringing a
pursuit to a successful conclusion (other than
always having the option to abandon pursuit).
Among the options that can become available are
the following:
o Allow a better-suited agency to continue the
pursuit. For example, in California, the
California Highway Patrol is often asked to take
over pursuits that go onto freeways, because of
their experience in freeway pursuits, statewide
communications system, and patrol vehicle
performance capabilities.
o Allow a helicopter to take over the pursuit.
Because pursuits are typically following actions,
helicopters can allow officers to continue
following a suspect vehicle while ground units
cease active pursuit (driving with red lights and
sirens) and return to normal driving. Helicopters
equipped with infrared devices and/or video
monitoring technology are especially useful for
assisting in a pursuit or taking over for ground
units.
o Employ a pursuit termination technology.
Depending upon a wide range of variables that are
addressed in the technology section of this
report, appropriate technologies for this phase
could include cooperative systems and mechanical,
chemical, electronic, sensory, and tactical
interventions.
Selection of appropriate options, including those
not listed in this report, becomes an issue of
policy, public safety and acceptance, timing and
location, affordability, and availability.
Of particular concern in technology development
should be the duration of pursuits. As described
elsewhere in this report, the data indicate that
more than 70 percent of all pursuits involving a
collision last less than 5 minutes. The time
available for accessing and deploying any pursuit
termination technology and the time available for
progressing to the Arrival of Resources Phase for
successful application of technology to stop the
pursuit is very short.
The Arrival of Resources Phase continues until the
suspect decides to stop (statistically the most
common occurrence), the suspect's vehicle becomes
disabled or is forced to stop, or the suspect gets
away. Once any of these events occurs, the pursuit
enters its final phase.
Postpursuit Phase
The Postpursuit Phase is an essential component of
pursuit termination technology development. Merely
being able to cause a fleeing vehicle to stop is
not enough to make a technology useful for law
enforcement. Consideration also must be given to
what is likely to happen as the vehicle is coming
to a stop and immediately thereafter. It must be
remembered that the successful resolution of a
pursuit includes both safely stopping the vehicle
and safely taking any suspect(s) into custody. The
safety issue involves not only the fleeing
vehicle's occupants and pursuing officers, but
also the general public.
For the officers involved, the termination of a
pursuit merely exchanges one tactical operation
(the pursuit) for another (taking suspects into
custody). Any technology used to stop a vehicle
must not unduly interfere with ensuing tactical
operations. For instance, using a noxious gas to
cause a driver to want to stop is not generally a
viable option if pursuing officers would
themselves likely be impacted as they attempt to
make the arrest.
Pursuit termination technologies must likewise
have minimal impact upon the general public after
conclusion of the pursuit. Mechanical devices must
be able to target the pursued vehicle without
unduly affecting other traffic, including pursuing
officers. Any debris left by the application of
technology must be quickly removed to allow
resumption of normal traffic flow. For example,
sticky foams may be used to stop a fleeing
vehicle, but the prolonged cleanup operations
needed to restore the roadway to normal traffic
conditions make their use problematic.
Obviously, the safe termination of a pursuit does
not involve any collisions. Using technologies
from which loss of adequate vehicle control is a
foreseeable outcome merely substitutes one public
safety problem for another.
Finally, consideration must be given to the legal
issues that flow from postpursuit arrests.
Technologies must be able to withstand challenges
related to the seizure of the suspect and vehicle,
the technology being viewed as an application of
force, and liability stemming from issues related
to the technology itself as well as policies and
training involved in its use.
Summary
The PMTF's law enforcement professionals consider
it essential that technologists come to an
accurate understanding of what actually occurs
during a pursuit prior to embarking upon
technology development. In addition, the PMTF
strongly urges those who use an officer as part of
their technology development team to obtain a
broader scope of understanding of police pursuits
by consulting with recognized regional panels such
as the PMTF or NLECTC Advisory Councils to avoid
investment of scarce research and development
funds in very limited application projects. The
same advice holds true for government-funded
technology testing and development programs.
Pursuit termination technology should be developed
in concert with a wide range of cooperative
professional law enforcement input.
Pursuit Duration and Collisions
One aspect of developing technology for use in
police pursuits that needs careful attention is
the time it takes to set up and deploy the
technology under real-life conditions. Once again,
media portrayals often distort the length of
actual pursuits, even if it is unintentional.
Movies often show lengthy pursuits, and news
broadcasts now televise the progress of police
pursuits. What must be recognized is that most
pursuits usually end before a news helicopter and
crew can arrive at the scene. Therefore, even the
news portrayals of pursuits can give the
(inaccurate) appearance of pursuits typically
lasting up to 10 minutes or more.
The PMTF was interested in what, if any,
correlation might exist between the duration of
pursuits and any resulting collisions. Such a
correlation would illustrate whether short
pursuits or longer pursuits resulted in greater
risk to the public. If it was found that long
pursuits posed the greater risk, then technologies
that required some time to deploy prior to use
could be beneficial. However, if short- duration
pursuits were found to be more hazardous, then
technologies would need to be developed that could
be used during the first few minutes of the
pursuit.
The PMTF found, as have many pursuit researchers,
that there is little information available
regarding pursuits that can be used for serious
analytical research. The PMTF was able to locate
data from the California Highway Patrol covering
pursuits from all law enforcement agencies
statewide (except Federal agencies) for the years
1994 through 1996 that could be used to evaluate
the correlation between pursuit duration and
collisions. While the data provided did not
address the degree of injury resulting from the
collisions, only that a collision occurred, it did
show that 26 percent of California pursuits
involved collisions.
During its discussions, the PMTF members, relying
on their collective professional experience in the
western region, hypothesized that the vast
majority of all pursuit-related collisions occur
during the first few minutes of a pursuit. The
data from the California Highway Patrol in figure
3 supported the hypothesis.
As can be seen from the figure on California
pursuit data for the 3-year period of 1994 through
1996, a collision occurred in 26 percent of all
pursuits. Over one-half of all pursuit-related
collisions occurred in pursuits lasting 1 to 2
minutes; more than 73 percent occurred in pursuits
lasting 1 to 4 minutes; 83 percent of the
collisions occurred in pursuits lasting 6 minutes
or less.
The data also show a strong correlation between
the percentages of total pursuits by duration and
the distribution of collisions by pursuit
duration, with a slightly higher percentage of
collisions among shorter pursuits. Pursuits
lasting 1 to 4 minutes accounted for 68 percent of
all pursuits and 73 percent of all pursuit-related
collisions.
This clearly presents a challenge for those
seeking to develop pursuit termination
technologies. To impact a substantial number of
pursuits (47 percent) and pursuit-related
collisions (52 percent), a technology would need
to be deployed within the first 2 minutes of a
pursuit. A technology that takes only 6 minutes to
arrive on scene and be deployed would have the
potential to impact only 21 percent of all
pursuits and only 17 percent of all
pursuit-related collisions.
Legal Intervention Techniques
There are a number of techniques currently used to
prevent or terminate pursuits. These techniques
have a variety of names, including channelizing,
ramming, roadblocks, PIT, and boxing in, to name a
few. The common thread in these techniques is
generally the use of patrol cars to corral the
suspect vehicle or to cause it to spin out and
stop. Many of these techniques result in contact
between the suspect vehicle and police cars, so
the term "legal intervention" is often used to
differentiate this intentional contact from a
collision, which is generally an unplanned
incident.
Because legal intervention techniques are
essentially the tactical use of the patrol car,
they were not included in the PMTF's study of
pursuit technologies. The fact that there are few
other alternatives available for law enforcement's
use in stopping a fleeing vehicle simply
underscores the compelling need for research,
development, and commercialization of pursuit
termination technologies.
------------------------------
CHAPTER III
COMMUNITY ISSUES
The development of marketable pursuit-related
technologies requires an understanding of public
opinion as well as an understanding of pursuits
and technology. The PMTF reviewed a wide variety
of research but was unable to locate any
definitive studies of public opinion about police
pursuits that addressed regional opinions. Some
prior research involved smaller constituencies and
even some cities and counties, but none that
addressed the issue on a regional level were
located.
Obtaining public opinion information was important
to the PMTF for several reasons. As law
enforcement practitioners, we recognized that
introduction of technology into the law
enforcement arena often requires significant
public education to overcome concerns. Funding for
research as well as the purchase of any
technology, in most cases, comes directly from
taxpayers; the public has a "right" to have a say
in the way their money is spent. Additionally, if
technologists are not aware of public opinion,
they may create a technology that is effective in
stopping a pursuit but which cannot be used
because of public concerns.
Several examples of the need to take the pulse of
the public prior to leaping at technological
solutions came to the attention of the PMTF. One
involved a story widely reported by the Associated
Press and published in various newspapers in
August 1996. The story involved a "harpoon"
designed by a Finnish police sergeant that is
mounted on the front bumper of the police car. The
harpoon is rammed into the trunk area of the
pursued vehicle, becomes lodged in place by means
of hydraulically operated barbs, and causes the
car to come to a stop as the police unit brakes.
The harpoon can even introduce tear gas into the
pursued car through its hollow shaft. Even as this
story was being widely circulated, some people
were asserting that it was set up by the Finnish
sergeant as a joke. However, the story was
presented in the American press as a real attempt
at using technology to stop pursuits.
Needless to say, the PMTF rejected the "harpoon"
technology as presented, noting its inherent
dangers to occupants in the rear seat of a pursued
vehicle as well as any person who may be secreted
in vehicle trunks.
A second technology that came to the attention of
the PMTF was described as a "rocket-powered"
direct-injection device that was "fired at" the
pursued vehicle. While this type of technology may
have merit, the PMTF was unanimous in its belief
that the words used to describe the technology
work against its acceptance. It is important that
technologies be designed and marketed with a view
toward widespread public acceptance.
The PMTF believed that, prior to making
recommendations regarding pursuit technologies, it
was important to understand public opinion
regarding pursuits and potential technologies. The
PMTF created the Community Issues Subcommittee and
assigned it the following tasks:
1.--Conduct a public survey throughout the western
region to determine issue awareness and opinions
regarding pursuits.
2.--Conduct a survey of line-level law enforcement
officers throughout the western region to
determine their opinions regarding pursuits.
3.--Compare the results of the public opinion
survey and line officer survey.
4.--Review literature of public lobbying
organizations regarding pursuits.
5.--Make recommendations on public relations and
public education initiatives based upon survey
results and the PMTF's input.
This section of the PMTF's report provides the
results of their research.
Public Opinion Survey
A Request for Proposal was produced by The
Aerospace Corporation based upon the project
objectives. The evaluation committee selected Luth
Research, Inc., a San Diego-based firm, as the
preferred bidder. Luth Research was subsequently
awarded the public opinion and law enforcement
survey contract. The survey's objectives were
fourfold: to measure overall public awareness of
police training in pursuits; to measure public
opinion of high-speed police pursuits; to assess
public opinion about five different types of
technologies that could be used to stop pursuits;
and to determine public acceptance of costs and
other issues associated with new technologies.
Luth Research, Inc., used industry-standard forms
of market research translated into three phases.
Phase one consisted of qualitative research
through the use of focus groups to develop
guidelines and direction for the community survey.
Phase two comprised the study's quantitative
research and consisted of a telephone survey of
public opinion and a written questionnaire to
assess police officer responses (appendix I). The
survey's content was based upon the project
objectives and was designed to allow correlation
between the two groups in phase three.
The Community Issues Subcommittee assisted in the
development of questions, provided information
related to technologies, and identified areas
where the survey would be administered. Luth
Research then conducted the research independent
of the PMTF.
Phase two was conducted by telephone calls to
1,600 persons in urban and rural areas from the
States of Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon,
Utah, and Washington. Interviews were conducted
with 600 subjects in the greater San Diego, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco areas of California,
and 200 interviews were conducted in each of the
other 5 States. The responses were collected from
April 4 through April 24, 1997. Researchers noted
that there was no significant variation in
responses based upon characteristics such as
whether the area was a State or whether it was
urban or rural.
Policy Issues
Respondents were asked which of the following
types of policies best described their feelings
about how police pursuits should be conducted.
Discretionary--It should provide broad guidelines
but most decisions regarding a pursuit should be
at the discretion of the officer involved.
Limited--It should place certain restrictions on
the officers' judgment, such as forbidding
pursuits of a juvenile, traffic offender, or
property offender.
Restrictive--Pursuits should be
restricted/prohibited by clearly defining
circumstances where risks of nonpursuit outweigh
the risks of pursuit.
Prohibited--Pursuits should not be allowed in any
circumstance.
The discretionary policy was preferred by 52
percent, the limited policy by 24 percent, the
restrictive policy by 20 percent, and the
prohibitive pursuit policy by 4 percent.
The responses clearly demonstrate that public
opinion has not been swayed to an "antipursuit"
extreme, nor has it swung to a
"pursue-at-any-cost" extreme. The sampled
communities and law enforcement officers
apparently believe that pursuits are a valid, and
necessary, police tool when the proper procedures,
decision making, and technologies are applied.
Perhaps the clearest way to present these data is
to indicate that only 4 percent believe pursuits
should be prohibited, 52 percent believe the
pursuing officer should use discretion within
broad guidelines, and 44 percent believe there
should be some type of specified restrictions on
pursuits that take into consideration the nature
of the offense and the safety risks involved.
These results square with other survey results
that indicated that 71 percent believe that
pursuits are a necessary tool in fighting crime
and that 81 percent believe pursuit decisions need
to be handled on a case-by-case basis.
The data derived from this survey match well data
from a recent study conducted by Dr. Geoffrey P.
Alpert of the University of South Carolina College
of Criminal Justice. Dr. Alpert was kind enough to
provide the PMTF's researcher with a copy of his
(at that time) unpublished manuscript from a study
of public opinions about police pursuits through
interviews of persons in Aiken County, South
Carolina; Omaha, Nebraska; and Baltimore,
Maryland. The PMTF respectfully refers readers of
this report to Dr. Alpert's forthcoming report for
details of his study, as it would be inappropriate
to quote extensively from his unpublished work.
However, one of his conclusions speaks to the
issue here: "The public overwhelmingly supports
pursuits for serious criminal offenses." He
further notes that public support is commensurate
with the seriousness of the offense.
Technology Issues
The PMTF was not able to locate any other research
on public opinions about technologies that can be
used to resolve problems related to police
pursuits. To our knowledge, this was the first
such attempt to gauge public awareness and public
opinion on this topic.
Respondents were asked to "describe your ideal
instrument or tool that would be used for police
to stop fleeing suspects." This inquiry required
an unaided response and was used for gauging
respondents' current knowledge about
pursuit-related technologies. The top responses,
listed below, appear to illustrate a lack of
knowledge about technologies potentially available
to law enforcement.
Don't Know--416--26.19%
Spiked Strips--230--14.38%
Helicopters--208--13.00%
Guns--140--8.75%
Police Vehicles--126--7.8%
Barricades--118--7.38%
Radios--117--7.31%
Laser Tools--64--4.00%
Total Response--1,600
After obtaining the unaided responses, respondents
were asked about various types of technologies.
They were specifically asked about spiked strips,
electrical/electromagnetic disablers, laser
disablers, pager disablers (cooperative systems),
and barriers. When asked their preference for the
various technologies, respondents rated them as
their first or second choice as follows:
--Electrical/electromagnetic disabler--54 percent
--Spiked strips--47 percent
--Laser disabler--41 percent
--Pager disabler--30 percent
--Barriers--27 percent
Even though these responses have no apparent basis
in scientific or technological competence, they
have great potential importance for technologists.
Public opinion appears to support development of
electrical/electromagnet disablers in addition to
the current technology of spiked strips. In terms
of marketing technologies, electrical devices,
spiked strips, and laser devices appear to have a
degree of "preacceptance" that could help bring
technologies to market.
Line Officer Survey
The Community Issues Subcommittee created the line
officer survey in cooperation with Luth Research,
Inc., to enable the PMTF to understand
similarities and contrasts between the ideas and
beliefs of the community and law enforcement
officers. This survey, phase two of the project,
differs from the PMTF's other law enforcement
survey in that it targeted line-level personnel
rather than agency heads.
Assessment of police opinion consisted of
self-administered mail-back surveys sent to
Federal, State, and local police officers and
deputies. It included departments with
jurisdictions within the 32 areas sampled for the
public opinion survey. Urban and rural
representation was divided using the same general
distribution used for the public opinion survey.
A total of 2,000 questionnaires were mailed to 57
law enforcement agencies throughout the western
United States in April 1997. Surveys were to be
completed anonymously and returned in a
self-addressed, postage-paid envelope to limit the
likelihood that officers would answer the
questions as they thought their agency would like.
Completed questionnaires were returned by members
of all but 4 of the agencies targeted (a total of
1,085 were returned). Although the PMTF received
fewer than the desired number of responses, it is
believed that the number received yielded a
statistically relevant sample nonetheless.
Since the PMTF recognized that training, policy,
and proficiency in the operation of any pursuit
technology is an important issue, questions
centered on those issues. Of those who were
surveyed, 97 percent reported receiving training
regarding vehicle pursuits. Seventy percent
reported having reviewed their agency's pursuit
policy within the past 6 months, and only 10
percent reported that more than 1 year had passed
since they last reviewed the policy. Forty-nine
percent of the officers reported that their review
of the policy was self-initiated, and 36 percent
reported it was due to a departmental requirement.
Thirty-seven and one-half percent indicated they
felt no need for additional pursuit training.
Fifty-two percent of the officers reported they
had been involved in fewer than 10 pursuits
throughout their careers. Seventy percent reported
they had been involved in fewer than 15 pursuits
during their careers. Twenty-one and one-tenth
percent reported they had 0-5 years experience in
law enforcement; 29.9 percent had 6-10 years; 20.7
percent had 11-15 years; 16.1 percent had 16-20
years; and 12.2 percent reported more than 20
years of experience. Assuming the accuracy of the
responses, including both the years of experience
and number of pursuits in which they were
involved, involvement in a pursuit is a very rare
occurrence for most officers.
Comparison of Public and Line Officer Survey
Results
Probably the most notable finding from comparing
the public's responses with law enforcement
officers' responses in the surveys was the degree
of consistency in their support of technologies to
be used to stop pursuits. The community and police
respondents had very similar beliefs on some core
issues of police pursuit training, methodology,
control, and technology. When responses varied, it
was typically the officers who provided the more
"conservative" responses. Despite the risk, both
the public and law enforcement officers see
vehicle pursuits as a necessary tool in
crimefighting. The responses that follow were
obtained from a series of statements requiring
ratings from one to five, with a one rating
indicating strong disagreement and a five rating
representing strong agreement with the statement.
This rating system provides a good gauge of
opinions in that it allows for a seemingly neutral
rating of "three" for each statement.
There was a significant disparity in responses by
the public and police about the necessity of
pursuit as a crimefighting tool. Almost 20 percent
more officers than the public indicated strong
agreement that pursuits are necessary, and only
3.3 percent of the officers indicated strong
disagreement. (See figure 4.) There was an 18.5
percent ambivalent response from the public, but
only a 6 percent ambivalent response from the
officers. This appears to support the assumption
that officers have a greater fear than the public
that losing the option of pursuit will have a
serious impact upon law enforcement. This is
partially supported by a study by Homant and
Kennedy (1994) wherein 15 percent of those
surveyed said they would be tempted to elude
police if they know the police would not pursue
them. When coupled with an additional 6 percent
who were "unsure," it would be logical to conclude
that up to 21 percent of those involved in the
survey could well be tempted to flee if police
pursuit were eliminated.
Another dissimilarity in the questionnaire
responses involved the issue of when to pursue.
More officers (69.3 percent) than the public (59.4
percent) responded that pursuit is best only when
the risk of nonpursuit outweighs the risk of
pursuit. This may well indicate that today's
officer is more attuned to the dangers of pursuit
than the public and is more inclined to limit
pursuits based upon safety considerations than the
public. While it must be admitted that officers'
sensitivity to the dangers of pursuit may well be
grounded in the public debate in recent years, it
clearly indicates that officers are in agreement
with those who preach that pursuits should not
create a greater public danger than they are
intended to solve. One area of continuing debate
about this issue, of course, is evaluation of the
risks of not pursuing. The California Highway
Patrol published a report, The Evaluation of Risk:
Initial Cause vs. Final Outcome in Police Pursuits
(August 1995) that concluded that, because of the
high number of felons arrested at the conclusion
of a pursuit undertaken due to a traffic offense
or minor offense, basing the decision to pursue
upon the offense may not be an effective approach
to public safety.
The May 1997 NIJ Research in Brief "Police
Pursuit: Policy and Training" describes additional
research and similar findings related to law
enforcement and public opinions regarding
pursuits.
Unfortunately, a proofing error may have distorted
the ability to compare the public's opinion to
that of line officers as it pertains to the role
played by police supervisors during pursuits.
Omission of the word "all" from one question on
the officer's questionnaire (see figure 4) may
have resulted in officers responding to the
question from a perspective that includes
supervisory involvement as a normal course of
events during tactical operations, thereby
increasing agreement responses. Inclusion of the
word "all" in the public opinion survey may have
led some of the public to believe that agreeing
with the statement removed all of the officers'
discretion from pursuit operations, thereby
lowering the number of responses in agreement.
Nonetheless, among officers there is indication of
very strong agreement with supervisory
control/direction in pursuits (87.4 percent) and
very little disagreement (6.3 percent).
Both the public and officers were asked about
seven specific types of technologies. Some of the
questions related to the perceived risk of using
the technology as well as its perceived
effectiveness. When reviewing the data in figure
5, it is important to keep in mind that, with the
possible exception of spiked strips, little
detailed information was available to the
respondents with regard to the technologies.
These data indicate that officers believe that the
technologies, with the exception of barriers,
would be safer than the public believes they will
be. This also indicates a need for law enforcement
and technologists to emphasize the safety of
products to be developed or used.
Responses about mandated versus voluntary
installation of the so-called cooperative systems
(laser- and pager-activated) show wide variation
between the beliefs of the public and line
officers. Perhaps experience with use of seat
belts, airbags, and the like have resulted in the
belief by officers that a good (if not the best)
method of ensuring that cooperative systems are in
widespread use is to require their installation.
This may also denote a key difference in the
social value systems of the two groups, with the
officers being more concerned with the ability to
terminate pursuits and apprehend suspects and the
public more concerned with issues of cost,
personal freedom, and the potential for abuse of
the technology systems.
Literature Review
The PMTF sought to review a variety of literature
relating to police pursuits from several
perspectives related to technology. The task force
was desirous of learning about technologies that
were available and/or under development. We were
interested in learning the bases for various
policy viewpoints. Additionally, we wanted to
determine as many facts about pursuits as we
could, from whatever source, to aid in technology
development--even if only to illustrate the need
for such development.
One aspect of the literature search that was
surprising was the lack of verifiable data. Data
reported as fact bore little resemblance to the
experiences of the task force members or to other
studies. Some of this data was the result of
applying information from a known study to a
national "estimate" of pursuit occurrences. Some
was the result of questionable categorization of
incidents, and some was the result of reporting,
in an abbreviated way, the results of a study
without defining the terms used in the study.
Illustrations of these data deficiencies follow.
For example, some advocacy groups estimate that
there are 250,000 police pursuits each year, that
1 percent result in a fatality, that they cause
2,500 deaths and 55,000 injuries each year. There
is simply no solid evidence to support these
figures. The State of California has collected
detailed statewide pursuit data for several years.
From 1994 to 1996, California averaged 6,811
pursuits each year. If there were 250,000 pursuits
per year nationwide, then pursuits in California
would account for only 2.72 percent of all
pursuits. This is highly unlikely, because
one-eighth of the Nation's population and 13
percent of all registered vehicles nationwide are
in California.
Although studies have indicated that approximately
1 percent of all pursuits involve a fatality, the
PMTF was provided with data from the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration that show
that, for the period 1990 to 1994, an average of
331 people nationwide died as a result of pursuits
(interestingly, 78.9 percent of those killed were
in the pursued vehicle). During that same period,
an average of 67.8 "uninvolved" people died each
year as a result of high-speed pursuits.
California's pursuit data from 1994 to 1996 shed
some additional light on this subject. For every
100 reported pursuits during that period, 0.46
people were killed, 2.06 people were severely
injured, 7.10 people sustained other visible
injury, and 17 people complained of pain, but had
no visible injury. When one considers that a
pursuit collision often results in multiple
injuries, it becomes apparent that, if the
California data are representative of the Nation,
approximately 2 percent of all pursuits result in
serious injury, and about one-half of 1 percent
involved a fatality. Interestingly, the pursued
suspects suffered 67.56 percent of the combined
fatalities and serious injuries.
Although any death as a result of a pursuit is
tragic, the numbers do not support allegations of
an epidemic of death at the hands of pursuing
officers.
In a 1989 article that appeared in The Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology (1989), noted
researchers Geoffrey Alpert and Roger Dunham
conducted research into police pursuits that
yielded a variety of interesting results. Alpert
and Dunham examined the 323 pursuits initiated by
the Metro-Dade Police Department in 1987. Their
findings, in many ways, are consistent with those
from subsequent studies, including the fact that
the vast majority of all pursuits (73 percent)
lasted 5 minutes or less. In addressing the issue
of injuries and death, the following was written
on pages 528-529:
"One hundred and ten (34 percent) of the pursuits
resulted in an accident, 75 (23 percent) included
injuries, and 144 (45 percent) involved property
damage. Seventy-seven percent of the chases
resulted in no personal injury. An analysis of
these few personal injuries indicated that in 23
chases a police officer was injured, and in five
chases a bystander was injured. These numbers are
fewer than anticipated, but they represent serious
concerns for law enforcement that must be
addressed and resolved. The remaining 47 injuries
were to the defendants or their passengers. Nearly
one-third of these injuries occurred after the
chase terminated and while the officer was
attempting to make an arrest. The three deaths
included a shooting and two drownings. In one
pursuit, the offender used his vehicle as a weapon
and attempted to run over a police officer, but
was shot by another officer from a neighboring
jurisdiction. One of the drownings involved a
suspect who exited his vehicle and jumped into a
canal. The other drowning involved a suspect who
ran off the road into a canal."
A footnote at the bottom of page 528 reads,
"Thirty-four pursuit incidents included property
damage that resulted from the apprehension of the
suspect after the termination of the chase."
If one-third of the injuries reported occurred
after the pursuit was over, it may be more
accurate to report that 15 percent (rather than 23
percent) of the pursuits involved injuries. (Note:
Since the numbers used apparently refer to persons
injured, no correlation can be made from these
data regarding the number of pursuits that result
in injury, because there could be several injuries
resulting from a single pursuit.) Also, since 34
of the 144 reported incidents of property damage
occurred after the conclusion of the pursuit, it
would be more accurate to report that 34 percent
(rather than 45 percent) of the pursuits involved
property damage (a number very close to the 110
reported collisions). Finally, it seems odd that a
person who had been pursued who stops, runs away,
jumps into a canal and subsequently drowns would
be classified as a death resulting from a pursuit.
To show how these seemingly minor numerical
variations can dramatically skew related data, the
elimination of the one death that resulted from a
suspect voluntarily leaping into a canal changes
the death rate of pursuits from 0.928 to 0.619.
Applying just this factor to the widely reported
"estimate" of 250,000 pursuits nationwide each
year would result in an estimate of 1,547 deaths--
a drop of 39 percent in the "estimated" 2,500
deaths each year. (This example is provided to
illustrate the importance of using accurate data
and the inherent problems associated with
extrapolations, not to diminish the importance of
even a single death.)
Finally, even within the various classifications
related to many pursuit outcomes, there are
varying degrees of property damage, collision, and
injury. For example, when a pursued suspect stops
the car and runs, but leaves the car in gear, and
that car then collides with a fixed object such as
a street light, the collision is classified as an
accident. This type of accident is very different
from what is normally envisioned by the phrase
"pursuit-related collision." Minor abrasions or
muscle soreness frequently result from collisions,
but they are not the injuries often envisioned by
the phrase "injuries caused by high-speed
pursuits." For pursuit data to have validity in
its application to public policy and to the market
forces that govern technology development and
sales, it must be accurate and sufficiently
detailed to allow a wide variety of analyses.
Since all technological interventions contain some
margin for injury or even death under some
circumstances, it is important for us to have
accurate data on pursuits in general, and on
related injuries, collisions, fatalities, and
property damage as well. Law enforcement and other
governmental agencies need to take the lead in the
compilation and release to the public of accurate
and complete statistics related to pursuits.
Current data collection methods are insufficient
to meet this challenge.
Dealing With Polarization
It seems that in America today there are two sides
to every issue--and the two sides are wide apart
without any indication of common ground. This
trend is disheartening to those who are seeking to
build consensus upon important issues of the day,
and its impact is felt in the debate concerning
police pursuits.
Public research has been encouraging in this
regard. Research conducted to date indicates
strong public approval of police pursuits as long
as certain safeguards are in place. This middle
ground, somewhere between the extremes of "pursue
at all costs" and "never pursue anyone for any
reason," should prove a fertile ground for support
of technological interventions for pursuits. Law
enforcement has been portrayed as cavalier in
dealing with fatalities related to pursuits.
Reports such as this one, that try to accurately
report data, can be misconstrued as subordinating
public safety in favor of apprehending minor
criminals and traffic offenders. On the other
hand, a "zero-tolerance" for any pursuit-related
fatality would, if carried into other social
realms, eliminate youth sports, air flight,
surgery, and a host of other beneficial
activities. "Is pursuit worth the loss of even one
life?" is a rhetorical question--akin to, "Have
you stopped beating your wife?" There is no way to
accurately assess the implications of public
policy decisions with those questions.
Law enforcement officials must take the lead in
developing policies that reflect community wishes
and maximize public safety, educating the public
about the impact of pursuits upon public safety,
and creating an environment wherein realistic
solutions, including technological solutions, to
this complex issue may emerge.
Public Relations and Education Initiatives
Precisely because issues relating to public safety
risks and pursuits are subject to rhetoric, it is
imperative that facts not only be available, but
that they be disseminated to the public. Although
they did no scientific analysis on the subject, it
is the sense of the PMTF membership that very
little factual data are being provided to the
public regarding the risks of police pursuit. In
fact, the large number of "don't know" responses
in the public opinion survey call attention to the
need for increased public information. However,
very little has been done to educate the public
about ways to minimize their personal risk upon
encountering a pursuit in progress.
As part of the research done by Luth Research,
their marketing and subject matter experts
reviewed the survey data to provide
recommendations to the PMTF on potential public
relations and education initiatives. Their report
included the following five recommendations:
1.--Design a multiphased information campaign
including television and print feature stories
about pursuits. Educate the public about legal
mandates, law enforcement training procedures, and
technological advances.
2.--Develop feature stories for the "COPS,"
"LAPD," and "High-Speed Pursuits" television shows
to educate the public about new pursuit technology
designed to end reckless escape behavior.
Highlight this research and the PMTF's recommended
technologies.
3.--Develop feature stories for "hi-tech" shows
regarding testing and development of new pursuit
technology.
4.--Develop a comprehensive police press kit
including draft press releases, new technology
descriptions, useful statistics, anecdotal data
about pursuits and risks, legal trends in pursuit
liability, and contact information for the PMTF.
5.--Market these research findings to increase
public and law enforcement understanding of the
issues.
The PMTF agrees with the concepts behind Luth's
public relations and education recommendations.
There appears to be great interest in pursuits, as
evidenced by reported viewer interest in recent
television specials. While individual law
enforcement agencies may have some difficulty
attracting or accessing television producers,
larger agencies such as NIJ may be able to assist
by floating ideas for such specials and advising
interested producers of potential contacts. The
PMTF recommends that the Federal Government use
the influence and expertise of its offices to
further public education about pursuits through
coordinating and/or facilitating such media
specials. It might also explore the potential for
developing and airing public interest
announcements, perhaps in partnership with the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), regarding public driving reactions to
oncoming pursuits and emergency vehicles.
Agencies must be careful, when taking public
relations initiatives, that they do not turn out
to be propaganda. The PMTF intentionally pairs the
concepts of public relations and education in
order to emphasize that providing factual
information to the public (education) will result
in improved relationships (public relations). The
critical component in this process is accurate
data regarding pursuits. Unfortunately, many
agencies and most States apparently still do not
maintain adequate pursuit data for public
education purposes. The PMTF recommends that law
enforcement agencies compile and disseminate
appropriate pursuit data for their own
organizations, and that States maintain statewide
pursuit data. Only through the use of accurate
data can appropriate decisions be made regarding
public policy and technology development.
------------------------------
CHAPTER IV
LEGAL ISSUES
The PMTF is acutely aware of the role of police
and products liability litigation in the United
States. Pursuits that result in collisions and/or
injuries quite frequently result in litigation,
especially when larger agencies are involved.
During the process of brainstorming and discussing
various technologies, task force members were
frequently reminded of potential liability
ramifications of various products, policies, and
practices.
In looking at the design, testing, deployment,
training, use, and potential outcomes of
pursuit-related technologies, the PMTF sought to
minimize, if not eliminate, risks that could arise
for technologists as well as government agencies.
Recognition of the potential risks involved with
marketing and use of pursuit technologies is
obviously an important component of technology
development.
This section of the PMTF's report addresses a wide
variety of pursuit and technology-related legal
issues. Legal issues related to technology
development, testing, marketing, and use are
presented to assist technologists in providing
viable products for law enforcement use. The
report from the PMTF's Legal Issues Subcommittee
is provided for a more scholarly and analytical
approach to these issues and can be found in
appendix II.
Legal Impact of Technology Development and Use
Perusing legal analyses can be a daunting task,
but it is nonetheless important to understand at
least the basic legal issues involved in
developing and using pursuit-related technologies.
Failure to grasp these issues may result in wasted
efforts to develop interesting technologies that
are not usable by law enforcement agencies.
The issues presented in this chapter include the
reasonableness of seizures, negligence as it
pertains to product design, adequate warnings of
risks, and negligence by users of the technology
(police training and malpractice).
The reader must keep in mind that legal issues are
evolving. This report should not be used as a
substitute for appropriate legal counsel, nor is
it designed as a definitive legal treatise.
Rather, it is a tool to bring out issues that
should be of interest to technologists addressing
the problems of police pursuits.
Reasonableness of Seizures
The use of technology to cause a fleeing vehicle
to come to a stop changes a pursuit into a seizure
situation, both of property (the vehicle itself)
and of persons (both in the pursued vehicle and
those "accidentally" stopped). Therefore, fourth
amendment considerations regarding the
reasonableness of seizures come into play, as well
as the total body of search and seizure law at the
State level.
By law, operators of vehicles are required to stop
for officers driving properly equipped police
vehicles and giving appropriate signals
(generally, flashing a colored light and/or
sounding of a siren). When a driver fails to
yield, as required by law, a pursuit may ensue.
The use of technology or another intervention
technique to forcibly stop the vehicle must be
able to pass the test of reasonableness in court.
Additionally, use of such technology may also
constitute use of force, which, under various
policies and laws also must be necessary and
reasonable in degree.
The PMTF identified several factors that should be
considered by technologists in developing devices
that will pass the test of reasonableness in the
areas of seizure and use of force. Among the
factors are the following:
o Is the product safe, not only for suspects and
officers, but for bystanders? The safety of a
product directly relates to its opportunities for
use. For example, ramming a pursued vehicle is a
hazardous maneuver. Would it then be reasonable to
ram a vehicle that fails to stop for a minor
traffic violation? Would it be reasonable to use
such force to effect a stop that it risks serious
injury to the suspect or others? Similar reasoning
must be applied to technologies used to effect the
stop.
o Are the results of using stopping technology
acceptable to most of the public? Standards of
reasonableness may vary from area to area, and
even from court to court. Devices that destroy a
vehicle's engine may be considered unreasonable
for use in pursuits related to minor violations.
Since most pursuits are of short duration and many
are for relatively minor offenses, such a device
may not have a significant impact on public safety
because they have few potential uses.
o Privacy issues arise concerning using
pre-emplaced devices on a vehicle that allow
officers to cause the vehicle to come to a stop.
Such systems voluntarily emplaced by consumers are
referred to as "cooperative systems" in this
report. Nonconsensual use of such a system by
police could give rise to fourth amendment
actions. Mandated use of such systems could be
considered a public safety measure similar to laws
regarding use of air bags, seat belts, and other
automotive safety features. While results would
not be immediate, there could be long-term public
safety enhancements through such a mandate. Some
would argue that mandated installation of such
devices would be an invasion of privacy, but a far
better argument could be made that fleeing lawful
detention by police in a high-speed chase is not a
reasonable threat to privacy.
Product Design Negligence
Product design negligence is a concern not only to
law enforcement, but to those who design,
manufacture, and sell technologies. Safety
standards abound in virtually all areas of
technology, but are not standard for pursuit
termination technologies per se. For example,
there is no operational standard for electrical
vehicle stoppers, yet there are standards for the
use of electronic devices.
In pursuit technology development, product safety
standards not only include the use of the
technology itself, but also its aftermath. For
example, if a chemical system meets or exceeds all
safety standards but makes a vehicle using the
system unsafe to drive, it may not be viable.
There are various systems that could be used to
introduce tear gas or oleoresin capsicum (pepper
spray) into a vehicle to incapacitate or interfere
with the driver's desire to continue fleeing. But
if use of this system causes the driver's ability
to control the vehicle to be impaired because it
causes his or her eyes to tear, its use for
pursuits would be problematic, even in the most
serious of cases.
The PMTF identified several factors that should be
considered by technologists in developing devices
that will pass tests related to product design
liability. Among the factors are the following:
o Any pursuit termination technology must have
fully documented safety and effectiveness testing
not only from laboratory analysis, but also from
realistic field testing. Almost all law
enforcement agencies demonstrate reluctance to
conduct product safety testing in real-life
situations by deploying experimental products for
field use; the consequences of a test that
demonstrates the product is not safe or effective
for its intended use are too great. This is an
area in which government-sponsored and/or
-monitored testing, in cooperation with
appropriate law enforcement representatives, could
be of great assistance in bringing such
technologies successfully to market. The PMTF
recommends that field testing of technologies by
qualified test teams, including appropriate law
enforcement representatives, be implemented.
Developers of technologies for law enforcement
appear to have limited experience in conducting
appropriate field testing. As previously mentioned
in this report, the public's image of pursuits is
quite different from what really happens. Adequate
testing facilities may not be available for
testing technologies developed by small
entrepreneurs rather than large corporations. This
is another area in which government-sponsored
and/or -monitored testing, in cooperation with
regional law enforcement representatives (such as
the membership of the PMTF), could be of great
assistance in bringing such devices successfully
to market.
o The PMTF believes, from their experience, that
law enforcement agencies seek products that can be
certified safe and effective. Police departments
generally lack the scientific and technical
expertise to perform product liability testing.
Manufacturers need to provide products that have
passed appropriate safety and liability tests.
o Any pursuit termination technology needs to
allow the driver of the fleeing vehicle to come to
a safe, controlled stop. The degree of control
that a driver can maintain directly relates to the
degree and reasonableness of force used to end the
pursuit. Degree of force, in this context, is a
reference to a continuum; on one extreme, a
complete lack of vehicle control would likely be
equated with deadly force, on the other,
maintaining full control of the vehicle could be
equated with minimal or no use of force. The more
control a driver can maintain over a pursued
vehicle, the greater the likelihood that the
technology can be used on more pursuits, thereby
having a greater impact on public safety than
technologies that can only be used under extreme
circumstances.
Adequate Warnings
Adequate warning of any danger associated with the
use of a pursuit termination technology is closely
linked to product design and testing as well as
training issues related to negligent use of the
product. An adequate, real-life testing program
for any pursuit technology should reveal to the
designer and manufacturer any significant safety
issues that users need to be warned about. Product
users need to be fully apprised of such issues in
the clearest, most concise, and most accurate
manner possible.
Much of the current product literature reviewed by
the PMTF is marketing information. While the
accuracy of the information is not doubted, the
information is obviously presented in a manner
designed to impact emotion rather than logic in
many cases. In evaluating product literature, the
PMTF is much more interested in factual testing
information and specifications from credible
independent testing agencies than in commercial
advertising and testimonials. Pursuit technology
literature should not be compared with the flood
of advertising coming from pharmaceutical
manufacturers; the PMTF wants to review the small
print that follows the ad rather than look at the
photos of smiling faces touting the wonders of the
new drug. We believe this reflects the desire of
most law enforcement executives and managers
throughout the western region.
The PMTF identified several factors that should be
considered by technologists developing devices
that provide adequate warnings to users. Among
those factors are the following:
o Product literature should include detailed
information concerning product testing, such as
potential adverse outcomes. The percentage of
adverse outcomes as well as ineffective uses for
the product should be clearly written so that
users know the likelihood of unsuccessful or
adverse applications as well as successful ones.
o Product literature should include detailed
information concerning any impact devices might
have on the driver or his or her ability to
control the targeted vehicle. Such information
needs to include test data on a wide variety of
vehicle types, including motorcycles and oversized
vehicles. It needs to address potential injuries
of suspects, officers, and bystanders, including
any foreseeable but unlikely outcomes.
o Any product warning that significantly limits
use of the product should be an indication to the
designer that the product will most likely not be
effective or usable for the vast majority of
pursuits. Hence, its marketability will be
limited.
o Product warnings need to be written in plain
language rather than in technical terms. They need
to be written so that any officer can fully
understand them.
Negligent Use
In our increasingly litigious society, law
enforcement officials have great concern about the
potential for litigation that may develop from
their use of any new product. Law enforcement is
characterized by officers under "indirect
supervision" (meaning no supervisor is onsite)
having to exercise a high degree of professional
judgment and discretion while taking immediate
action under stressful circumstances. Because more
than 70 percent of all collisions occur before the
5th minute of a pursuit, the likelihood of line
officers taking immediate action to terminate a
pursuit without onsite supervision is great. This
means that products must be fairly simple and safe
to use under great time constraints and stress.
Traditionally, law enforcement uses training as a
means to ensure competence in using the tools of
the profession. Training, especially in smaller
agencies, is enormously expensive. Pursuit
termination technologies will require training
prior to their use. Manufacturers must provide
agencies with complete training guides for their
products. Such guides must not only address the
operation of the device, but also when it is to be
used, when it is not to be used, and how to
properly handle any of the anticipated outcomes,
including those that may be adverse. Because
pursuits are relatively rare occurrences for
individual officers, refresher training at
appropriate intervals is also needed.
The PMTF identified several factors that should be
considered by technologists to address concerns
related to potential negligence in the use of the
product. Among the factors are the following:
o The more complex the operation of the unit, the
less likely it is to be purchased and used.
Because a device must be set up and used with a
great degree of immediacy and under stressful
conditions, it should be as simple to operate as
possible. Ideally, its operation would coincide
with some other training and there should be
minimal, if any, site specific adjustments to be
made (for intensity, duration, or width or
distance of exposures, etc.). Onsite predeployment
adjustments increase the likelihood of operator
error, adverse outcomes, and subsequent
litigation.
o Training in the use of the technology should be
fully developed by the manufacturer, preferably
with significant input from law enforcement in
formulating the training materials and processes.
Such cooperation between law enforcement and
manufacturers can enhance the technical and
practical aspects of training for use. Ideally, a
manufacturer's representative would provide at
least the initial training in the product's use.
The manufacturer should keep purchasers advised of
any updates in training or use discovered after
the sale and initial training. Training needs to
include any known or suspected risks associated
with the operation and use of the technology.
o The manufacturer should provide guidelines for
refresher training required to maintain the
competence of operators of the technology.
o Initial and refresher training of officers
should include both written and practical
application tests to ensure that the operator is
competent to operate the technology and to
document the appropriateness of the training
provided. Law enforcement agencies share this
training responsibility. They must ensure that
training is required and must incorporate
technology training into their inservice
curriculums.
Legislation
Although not part of its mandate, the PMTF had
ancillary interest in and discussion of
legislative issues. Legislation is needed in order
to support the research, development, and
commercialization of pursuit-related technology.
Because pursuit preemption was a topic of
consideration by the PMTF, some discussion
centered on why persons who may not be wanted for
a serious crime would choose to flee. The only
answer appeared to be that the suspect thought he
or she would be able to escape, and the risk of
doing so appeared to be reasonable. The
reasonability of the risk to the fleeing suspect
is one area that lawmakers could address through
legislation. Since police pursuits may present a
high degree of hazard to the public, the penalty
for suspects who lead police in pursuits should be
commensurate with the hazard.
The PMTF recommends that States examine measures
that would ensure that fleeing from a lawful
attempt at detention or arrest in a motor vehicle
is a serious crime with significant penalties.
Some statutes may base sanctions against fleeing
on the outcome of the pursuit: If no one is
injured, sanctions are light; if an injury
results, sanctions are more serious. Outcome-based
penalties may fail to give credence to assertions
that pursuits are a serious risk to public safety.
The PMTF recommends that States examine measures
that would ensure that a person convicted of using
a motor vehicle to flee from lawful detention or
arrest (that is, one that assumes at least one
violation of the rules of the road) serves
significant jail time and/or pays a substantial
fine and that the motor vehicle used be seized and
forfeited if owned by the driver. The State of
Utah has some pursuit-related laws that could be
used as a sample for other jurisdictions (see
appendix III).
Using technology in pursuits can result in
lawsuits when the use results in an injury or
property damage. Fear of litigation should not be
a barrier to the introduction of technologies to
stop pursuits. The PMTF recommends adoption of
legislation to provide civil immunities for
agencies and officers involved in a pursuit when
the suspect who is fleeing is involved in a
collision or otherwise causes injury or property
damage. Likewise, the PMTF recommends that
agencies and officers be afforded immunity from
liability resulting from injury to a suspect or
damage to the suspect's vehicle stemming from the
use of a technology in accordance with the
manufacturer's recommendations and instructions
and absent gross negligence in attempts to stop
the suspect's flight. Similar immunities for those
involved in product design and manufacture would
likely be beneficial to the development and
commercialization of pursuit-related technologies.
The PMTF recommends that a national model for
collection of pursuit statistics be developed,
perhaps through the IACP or similar professional
law enforcement organization, for the purpose of
encouraging and facilitating research and to
expand the body of knowledge relating to pursuits.
California has required reporting for several
years, and the resulting data have proven most
helpful to the PMTF. Unfortunately, similar data
are not available from most States, and this
results in a significant problem for pursuit
researchers and technologists.
To facilitate the use of cooperative systems,
States may need to enact legislation to allow law
enforcement to obtain information about access to
the system and authorization for its activation
through motor vehicle registration data, and the
PMTF recommends that States seriously consider
doing so. A more detailed discussion of this type
of technology and the basis for this need appears
in chapter V of this report.
------------------------------
CHAPTER V
VEHICLE-STOPPING TECHNOLOGIES
When the PMTF began its study of various
vehicle-stopping technologies and collateral
issues, its members had high hopes that a singular
technological solution would be found to address
the public safety issues related to pursuits. It
was easy to believe that, much as technology
created high-powered motor vehicles that were
capable of fleeing, it would also bring about a
quick, effective, and safe means of bringing those
fleeing vehicles to a stop. In light of
government-funded research into potential
solutions, the PMTF and others also reasoned that,
if the government can put a man on the Moon, then
the government can find a safe way to stop a
fleeing car. To date, the PMTF's assumptions
appear to have been overly optimistic; no singular
technological solution has appeared, and
government has not found "the way" to stop a
fleeing car. However, some technologies have shown
success in limited applications, and research to
date has shown some promising technologies that
may prove valuable after further development.
The Silver Bullet Assumption
In law enforcement parlance, a silver bullet is a
mythical projectile that can stop anything and
anyone; it is the bullet that is always on target
and is always effective as intended. In initial
meetings, the PMTF began its quest to locate the
silver bullet that would end police pursuits
safely and quickly. As the process continued, the
assumption that a silver bullet existed, or even
that one could be developed, began to dim. By the
end of their work, one phrase was frequently
repeated: "There is no silver bullet."
This is not to say that no universal, quick, safe,
and effective means will ever be found for police
pursuit termination. It means that the search for
a singular technological solution to this complex
problem has not resulted in a technology or device
available for universal application in the
immediate future. Because the PMTF's members knew
that pursuits are widely varied events governed by
a wide range of factors beyond the control of
police officials, the lack of a silver bullet
solution opened the door to consideration of a
wider array of technological options to address
the variations among pursuits, including the
cooperative systems technologies that could, in
time, provide almost universal vehicle-stopping
capability.
In the descriptions of technologies that follow
later in this section, the PMTF will make
observations and, in some instances,
recommendations concerning the types of pursuits
where technologies appear to be well-suited for
termination. Such observations and recommendations
are not intended to serve as an endorsement of any
product or technology, but rather to illustrate
potential uses for a given type of product. Any
person or agency intending to develop, test, or
use a pursuit termination technology must take
adequate independent measures to ensure its safety
and effectiveness for its intended use.
The Man on the Moon Assumption
Most likely, during one of the focus group
meetings involved in the community issues survey,
the PMTF heard the remark, "If the government can
put a man on the Moon, why can't the government
find a way to stop pursuits?" At first, the
question was troubling. Government officials and
law enforcement agencies across the Nation have
been looking for solutions to problems associated
with police pursuits for many years. Why then has
government been unable to provide a complete
solution to this problem?
Well, local government never put a man on the
Moon. County and State government never put a man
on the Moon. It took a costly, long-term,
concentrated effort of the Federal Government to
put a man on the Moon. A parallel can be drawn to
the development of pursuit-related technologies.
There are a host of issues that hinder the
development of pursuit-related technologies in our
current environment. The most prominent, in the
eyes of the PMTF, are research and development
costs, market forces, and the need to obtain
consensus from the public for implementation of
proposed solutions.
As a rule, local and State governments do not
maintain extensive (if any) research and
development operations. Such operations are costly
to maintain, and it is difficult to recoup their
costs without retailing the resulting products.
Since local and State governments generally do not
participate in profit ventures, they have
traditionally looked to the private sector to
provide products for government use. In the law
enforcement world, it is not infrequent for
officers themselves to dream up and produce
products that, in time, become staples of the
profession. But, as far as government agencies
themselves, there is very little (if any)
independent technological research being done.
Market forces likewise negatively impact the
production of pursuit-related technologies. When
the PMTF embarked upon its agency survey, it
located 1,420 law enforcement agencies in the 7
western States. Assuming an equal distribution of
agencies throughout the country, this would result
is slightly more than 10,000 agencies across the
Nation. If every one of them bought 20 individual
pursuit termination products, the total would be
200,000 units--not a large number of sales for a
product that requires substantial research and
development, exposes the manufacturer to
significant risk of civil litigation and in
general must be sold through a competitive
process. Taking into consideration that not all
agencies would buy such a product and that no
single product appears to offer a singular
solution, the potential profit margin for all but
the most exceptional products appears to be small.
Thus, market forces may mitigate against
development of such products.
Obtaining the consensus of the public for a
proposed solution may also prove to be quite
difficult. The United States has a strong
historical bent toward protecting individual
rights and privacy, and many of the proposed
technologies may stir Orwellian concerns about
government intrusion into personal liberties. In
the same vein, the people of the United States
have shown strong environmental interest and, in
many instances, distrust of chemicals, microwaves,
and radiation (even non-nuclear), especially as it
relates to personal exposure. Because of these and
other factors, there will likely be a need for a
well-planned public education campaign to garner
public support for the deployment and use of a new
technology (and many people seem to distrust
government "education" campaigns).
Because of these factors, the PMTF supports
continuation and expansion of research and testing
of pursuit termination and prevention technologies
in cooperation with regional law enforcement and
with oversight such as could be provided by the
PMTF or similar bodies. This would enable
entrepreneurs to overcome many of the obstacles
posed by research and development costs and market
forces, while remaining aware of issues related to
local public opinion. The oversight provided by
law enforcement professionals is an appropriate
screening process for ensuring that only the most
promising technologies, from a real-life
perspective, are tested. Technologies that prove
to be potentially beneficial during the testing
phase could be referred to agencies such as the
NIJ's Office of Law Enforcement Technology
Commercialization to encourage private sector
commercial development.
The PMTF was very pleased with the evidence of
partnership between local law enforcement and the
U.S. Departments of Justice and Defense,
throughout the life of the task force. The
availability of technology and technological input
from military sources was encouraging. The PMTF
recommends that appropriate action be taken to
encourage continued cooperation between agencies
of the Department of Defense and civilian law
enforcement to provide a stable basis for
continuing and accelerating the transfer of
appropriate defense technology, including pursuit
termination technology, for law enforcement use.
The PMTF supports local policymaking coupled with